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G David Schwartz

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                 WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL?

 As we cannot assume we are following a good moral principle, the question “Why should I be moral?” may be answered in either social or individualistic terms; that is in terms of political or psychological theory. 

 

First, if we attempt to answer the question politically, we can readily imagine a regime which says do what the regime says or die.  Here we have the choice of being moral in following the regime (which is not being moral at all) or else dying. If we choose to die rather than follow a not moral regime we may be acting morally and not yet ask why we should be moral. If we choose to follow the regime, there may become an evident discrepancy between what the regime says, and what is right. If we do what the regime says, just because they say so, we are immoral. If the regime changes, we must change to suit the new regime, and if we do what is right, we may prevent society from faltering. 

 

The ultimate prevention of social differences is to establish a moral regime. Hence, if we struggle to establish a moral regime, we are likely to be moral, and need not ask why we should be moral.

 

If we ask the question psychologically, several answers may be suggested, but ultimately if I am immoral (that is the alternative of being moral, unless we consider ‘blandness,’ i.e. being a bump on a log, a wall flower – in which case we have no psychological capacity to worry about either  to the positive or to the negative). If I am immoral, to repeat, it is both an effect of and a condition of alienation in two of the four primary senses:

            I) I am alienated from other people, e.g. if I lie, they will not believe my truths; if I cheat, they will not let me in their games – then my psychological state is placed in the wilderness of aloneness.

            II) if I am alienated from myself, e.g. if I lie I must lie consistently to cover over the initial lie; if I kill, I must kill everyone in order not to be found out; if I cheat and get kicked out of the game, my psychological state has no external circumstances to apply too equal loneliness.

 

“No man is an island” is more truly to be said to be “No man can live as an island.” Without friends, without community, without trust, I will die! Hence, being mortal is in one’s long-term interest, and ultimately in the interest of humanity. If humanity is satisfied, they will not do me in. If humanity is satisfied, we will then even apply ourselves to advancing human survival, e.g. qua the genus of rational, creative activity.

 

This is not strictly self interest, but of proactive everyday interests.

 

In short term, one’s image of man is at stake.  Do you think man is naturally a sniveling, greedy, pompous human being?  If so, look at what you are saying about yourself as well.

 

The converse question, “Why should I be moral,” is “Why should I elicit a gut reaction which occurs, at times, in all human beings”. You should not be purposively immoral,   we may agree. Then the question we originally asked, “Why should I be moral,” becomes “Why should I be moral in the way you advocate?”

Furthermore, if, as Ayn Rand suggested, even asking such questions as ”Why should I be moral” indicates more grayness, and hence, seems to be a form of moral relativism. (Which states, in some instances, if you do X you are wicked, while if I do X I am good. Apparently we must have some one universal criterion for deciding all moral issues. If we have this one universal criterion two things become clear. First, we will not be able to rationalize that you do X and be wicked whereas if I do the very same thing I am not wicked. Rather, the single criterion much be performed dis-interestedly, or as Kant says, from a duty to be moral. Also, the only question we can have in this case is “Am I behaving morally?” and not “Why should I be moral?”

 We may question the universal principle – that is testing it in specific circumstances, i.e. behave without taking it into account.

 What constitutes uniqueness?    The objection arises that if I say everyone else perform according to one principle,   I am not unique and I may want to defend my uniqueness.

Let me explicate what this claim to be unique expresses.

If everyone performs according to the single principle and I want to be unique, then I will most likely not perform according to this principle. There appear some obvious responses to this:

            a) If you do not perform according to the principle, that is, “act so as to maximize the possibility of human survival,” you may

                   I. act so as to minimize the possibility of human survival, while jettisoning yourself to the political state of original questions. If this is the case, then those who do act to maximizing human survival, under that principle of maximizing, may view you as a threat and put you in prison, or exterminate you. How unique are you then?

           Or, II, you may act under another principle, in which case you may be moral, but you must justify your principle, in which case, you may be moral, but if you are not recognized as a moral individual, you may be on someone’s list.

In either cases you may be strictly unique.         

            (b) You may act under another principle, in which case you may still be moral, but you must justify your principle or your position is tedious.

If your position gets too tedious or if you do justify your position you will convert all lateral thinking people.In either case, you remain strictly unique.   

            c) The next response is this: while it is true that anyone can act according to the moral principle, it may be the case that:

                       First, certain people do not act in such a manner and you are therefore unique in relation to them; but more profoundly,

                       Second, while anyone can act morally, you – and only you – can so act in yourself, for yourself, in relation to your world. This in the true sense if uniqueness.

                       Furthermore and in contrast to much of what was said above, this is not only a quantitative, but a qualitative life. It is one of quality and worthlessness, not mere bland existence. It is doing something of benefit, not merely being done unto.  

© G David Schwartz October 2005

G. David Schwartz is the former president of Seedhouse, the online interfaith committee. Schwartz is the author of A Jewish Appraisal of Dialogue, and coauthor, with Jacqueline Winston, of Parables In Black and White. Currently a volunteer at Drake Hospital in Cincinnati, Schwartz continues to write.

To contact the author, email here